But the virtue of the soul is its power. But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. On the contrary, The place and the object placed must be equal, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. Therefore in man and in every animal there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted. Reply to Objection 2. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. Therefore in man the essence of the sensitive soul is not the same as the essence of the intellectual soul. But it sometimes happens that such apparition comes about not merely by a change wrought in the beholders, but by an appearance which really exists outwardly. On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one substantial being. According to this being, then, Christ is not moved locally of Himself, but only accidentally, because Christ is not in this sacrament as in a place, as stated above (Article 5). By the power of the sacrament there is contained under it, as to the species of the bread, not only the flesh, but the entire body of Christ, that is, the bones the nerves, and the like. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. Objection 4. However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form yours by the distinction of the phantasmsthat is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in youif the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several intellects and one sensefor instance, if two men had one eyethere would be several seers, but one sight. Wherefore, after the consecration, the whole substance of Christ's body and blood is contained in this sacrament, just as the whole substance of the bread and wine was contained there before the consecration. Therefore there is but one intellect in all men. Therefore, for like reason, the glorified eye can see Christ as He is in this sacrament. As stated above (Article 4), the accidents of Christ's body are in this sacrament by real concomitance. Translated by. Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. Consequently the body of Christ fills that place. It seems that Christ's body is movably in this sacrament, because the Philosopher says (Topic. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. Objection 1. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligencethat a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. Hence we read in the profession of faith at Ephesus (P. I., chap. Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. Objection 5. Therefore there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. For the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. Now man is corruptible like other animals. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear from what has been said (I:75:2; which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Reply to Objection 5. Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. viii (Did. Is the entire Christ under each species of the sacrament? Theol.Imprimatur. The place in which Christ's body is, is not empty; nor yet is it properly filled with the substance of Christ's body, which is not there locally, as stated above; but it is filled with the sacramental species, which have to fill the place either because of the nature of dimensions, or at least miraculously, as they also subsist miraculously after the fashion of substance. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the body: as also is that part which serves the same power in a nobler manner. Reply to Objection 1. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. Concerning this we must consider (1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection. Objection 3. But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Theol.Imprimatur. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual beingfor instance, fire or air, or something of that sortmaintained that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we read, Phys. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. If therefore Christ be entirely under every part of the said species, it would follow that He is in this sacrament an infinite number of times: which is unreasonable; because the infinite is repugnant not only to nature, but likewise to grace. Now all this is fictious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter. Objection 1. In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Others said that the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately. iv). vii, 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, "a white man." Further, the human body is a mixed body. For we observe that the species and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these genera there are various degrees. Now an action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. But the place, where this sacrament is, is much less than the body of Christ. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament locally. Therefore, from the fact that species of the phantasms exist in It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. ii, 1). 2 Treatise on the Last End (Questions 1-5) 3 Treatise on Human Acts: Acts Peculiar to Man (Questions 6-21) 4 Treatise on the Passions (Questions 22-48) 5 Treatise on Habits (Questions 49-54) 6 Treatise on Habits in Particular (Questions 55-89) 7 Treatise on Law (Questions 90-108) Question. Objection 3. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. Nevertheless the substance of Christ's body is not the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of the bread: and therefore the substance of the bread was there locally by reason of its dimensions, because it was compared with that place through the medium of its own dimensions; but the substance of Christ's body is compared with that place through the medium of foreign dimensions, so that, on the contrary, the proper dimensions of Christ's body are compared with that place through the medium of substance; which is contrary to the notion of a located body. Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees. animal. Is the entire Christ under every part of the species? Objection 1. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), any part of Christ is in this sacrament in two ways: in one way, by the power of the sacrament; in another, from real concomitance. First of all, because Christ's body under its proper species can be seen only in one place, wherein it is definitively contained. Reply to Objection 3. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. This power is called the intellect. Further, Christ's body begins to be in this sacrament by consecration and conversion, as was said above (III:75:2-4). On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, Metaph. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. Instead of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of organs" (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes. Hence it is clear that the body of Christ is in this sacrament "by way of substance," and not by way of quantity. It was this argument which seems to have convinced those who held that Christ's body does not remain under this sacrament if it be reserved until the morrow. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. Reply to Objection 1. And not even the angelic intellect of its own natural power is capable of beholding it; consequently the devils cannot by their intellect perceive Christ in this sacrament, except through faith, to which they do not pay willing assent; yet they are convinced of it from the evidence of signs, according to James 2:19: "The devils believe, and tremble.". For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. lxxxiii): "Some are so foolish as to say that the mystical blessing departs from the sacrament, if any of its fragments remain until the next day: for Christ's consecrated body is not changed, and the power of the blessing, and the life-giving grace is perpetually in it." Objection 1. But matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said above (Article 4). The first cannot stand, as was shown above (I:75:4), for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. Reply to Objection 1. We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. This can be made clear by three different reasons. viii (Did. I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. Reply to Objection 1. POWER: The power of God (25), the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Objection 2. vii (Did. It seems, then, that it does not see Christ, as He is under the species of this sacrament. From which it is evident that the dimensions of the bread or wine are not changed into the dimensions of the body of Christ, but substance into substance. Accordingly, when our Lord said (John 6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed," there the word flesh is put for the entire body, because according to human custom it seems to be more adapted for eating, as men commonly are fed on the flesh of animals, but not on the bones or the like. Objection 3. Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does not share. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind," as stated in De Anima ii, 9. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the form. Union of Soul and Body in Man 1. Further, the Philosopher says (De Gener. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. Objection 1. Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first instrument of motion. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. And if to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object. Our bodily eye, on account of the sacramental species, is hindered from beholding the body of Christ underlying them, not merely as by way of veil (just as we are hindered from seeing what is covered with any corporeal veil), but also because Christ's body bears a relation to the medium surrounding this sacrament, not through its own accidents, but through the sacramental species. Reply to Objection 3. 78: Usury, or Interest on Money Lent: 1 First Part. And among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the glorified eye sees Christ always, as He is in His own species, according to Isaiah 33:17: "(His eyes) shall see the king in his beauty." But when such apparitions occur, it is evident that Christ is not present under His own species, because the entire Christ is contained in this sacrament, and He remains entire under the form in which He ascended to heaven: yet what appears miraculously in this sacrament is sometimes seen as a small particle of flesh, or at times as a small child. Consequently, it remains to be said, that, while the dimensions remain the same as before, there is a miraculous change wrought in the other accidents, such as shape, color, and the rest, so that flesh, or blood, or a child, is seen. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. Font. Asked by Bijoy J #1210109. But the measure of the bread and wine is much smaller than the measure of Christ's body. But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Objection 3. Reply to Objection 3. But the dimensive quantity of Christ's body is considerably larger than the dimensive quantity of the consecrated host according to every dimension. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. Last updated by jill d #170087 5 months ago 1/31/2022 5:23 AM. But no dimensive quantity is contained entirely in any whole, and in its every part. Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. Objection 3. It is this spiritual soul which, substantially joined with matter, sets up and constitutes an existing human being. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter. If nothing, then, be contained under one species, but what is contained under the other, and if the whole Christ be contained under both, it seems that one of them is superfluous in this sacrament. This argument is based on the nature of a body, arising from dimensive quantity. It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. vi, 1). The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. I answer that, If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of something nearer. I answer that, When any thing is one, as to subject, and manifold in being, there is nothing to hinder it from being moved in one respect, and yet to remain at rest in another just as it is one thing for a body to be white, and another thing, to be large; hence it can be moved as to its whiteness, and yet continue unmoved as to its magnitude. Thirdly, it is in keeping with its effect, in which sense it was stated above (III:74:1) that "the body is offered for the salvation of the body, and the blood for the salvation of the soul.". But every body occupying a place is in the place according to the manner of dimensive quantity, namely, inasmuch as it is commensurate with the place according to its dimensive quantity. Therefore the whole Christ is not contained under each species. On the contrary, It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Reply to Objection 1. Reply to Objection 2. Therefore the other part must be such that it can be moved. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates. Objection 1. Objection 4. The dimensions of the consecrated bread and wine continue, while a miraculous change is wrought in the other accidents, as stated above. In the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas says that "angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear." Source: Ia Q. Now it is the nature of a body for it to be "quantity having position" (Predic. Reply to Objection 1. Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form. But the proper totality of substance is contained indifferently in a small or large quantity; as the whole nature of air in a great or small amount of air, and the whole nature of a man in a big or small individual. vi, 6), that "in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire.". Objection 1. Is the body of Christ in this sacrament locally? Reply to Objection 4. Since therefore Christ exists in three substances, namely, the Godhead, soul and body, as shown above (III:2:5; III:5:3), it seems that the entire Christ is not under this sacrament. Reply to Objection 3. But there are many other parts of Christ's body, for instance, the nerves, bones, and such like. Animal. I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess according to Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this sacrament. But it is evident that the bread and wine cannot be changed either into the Godhead or into the soul of Christ. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse. Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive quantity of Christ's body to be there. Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a place. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. As has been already stated (III:75:5, after the consecration of the bread into the body of Christ, or of the wine into His blood, the accidents of both remain. And then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles. But to be in a place is an accident of a body; hence "where" is numbered among the nine kinds of accidents. And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the "genus"; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence it gathers the "difference" of man. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power. If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said (Article 1), it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. Neither, therefore, if this sacrament be reserved until morning, will Christ's body be there; and so it is not immovably in this sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. FIRST PART (QQ. Therefore the entire dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament. But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys. Because those species can be divided infinitely. Further, the truth ought to correspond with the figure. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference between man and the other animals. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act.

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